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Police

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CIA's history were few and far between, and were exceptions to the thrust of the Agency's important and primary mission—the collection and production of intelligence pertaining to foreign areas and developments.

Certainly at this time it is my firm belief that no activity of the Agency exceeds the limits of its authority under law.

Against this background, I would, however, like to make some suggestions for the Committee's consideration.

Several bills were introduced in the 93rd Congress to amend the National Security Act so as to clarify the extent of CIA's activities within the United States.

One of these amendments would add the word "foreign" before the word "intelligence" wherever it appears in the Act, to make crystal clear that the Agency's purpose and authority lie in the field of foreign intelligence.

Another amendment would amplify the current restrictions in law by specifying that within the United States the Agency will not engage:

"in any police or police-type operation or activity, any law enforcement operation or activity, any internal security operation or activity, or any domestic intelligence operation or activity." The Agency fully accepts such amendments as a statement of prohibited activity and as a way to reassure any concerned that CIA has no such function. Last July, I so testified before the legislative oversight Committee in the House and last September, I wrote to the Chairman of the legislative oversight Committee in the Senate assuring him that the Agency will abide by the letter and the spirit of the proposed amendments.

The prohibition in these bills is supplemented by the following additional proviso:

"Provided, however, that nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit CIA from protecting its installations or conducting personnel investigations of Agency employees and applicants or other individuals granted access to sensitive Agency information; nor from carrying on within the United States activities in support of its foreign intelligence responsibilities; nor from providing information resulting from foreign intelligence activities to those agencies responsible for the matters involved."

Again, we welcome this as a clear statement of what the Agency properly does in the United States in support of its

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should cause the charge to fall of its own weight, but in addition I believe the extensive investigations made into this subject, and in particular the tapes most recently released, indicate that CIA's limited assistance in 1971 certainly had nothing to do with the Watergate in 1972, and that CIA was the institution that said "No" to the cover-up rather than be involved in it.

There are also a number of allegations of improper CIA relationships with domestic police forces. The facts are that CIA maintained friendly liaison relationships with a number of police forces for assistance in CIA's mission of investigating its applicants, contractors, and similar contacts. These relationships from time to time included various mutual courtesies which have been warped into allegations of improper CIA manipulation of these police forces for domestic purposes. These allegations are false. Since the 1973 legislation barring any CIA assistance to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, CIA has terminated any assistance to the LEAA and in compliance with the spirit as well as the letter of that particular law has terminated any assistance to local police forces as well.

States against all enemies, foreign and domestic. I do not think anyone in CIA dropped the last two words off its oath.

Mr. Flynt. I hope that you don't.

In your prepared statement, your opening statement, you referred to allegations of your relationships with local governments and especially police departments of local government

Would you expand on that at this time?

Wr. Colby. Yes, Mr. Flynt. We had relationships
with a variety of police forces around the country. The
security officers doing investigations on applicants,
contractors and so forth, they obviously keep in touch with
the local police forces. They ask for information about the
individuals. They want to make sure that the police force
knows that they are operating there and looking around so
that they don't get arrested, and from time to time over

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In some cases we provided some training to police forces

We did that and this has come under criticism. It has been stopped.

The question has been raised by one Congressman whether we should reveal the names of all those police forces.

Certain of the police forces have given us permission to reveal their names and we have, or they have come out separately, but there are others that asked us not to.

Since the arrangement was established some years ago on a basis of confidentiality, I felt obliged to turn down the request for the publication of those names of those police forces, because I have a great number of American citizens who are very worried about whether CIA is going to reveal the fact that they worked with CIA, and I don't mean police forces. I mean a lot of businessmen, academics and everything else. I must indicate to those people that I am going to protect their names.

if you expect to be able to continue in the intelligence gathering business?

Mr. Colby. This is something that the intelligence business has in common with the media, Mr. Flynt. We both have to protect our sources.

Mr. Flynt. Thank you.

Mr. Mahon. Mr. Robinson, do you have questions?

Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Colby, you have mentioned several specific steps, one in particular with regard to records that have been kept on Americans that have been taken subsequent to the inquiries that have been made.

Can you recite other changes that have been made, other directives withdrawn or modified to assure that any valid criticism of the CIA will not again occur in these areas?

For example, the use of local police department

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credentials, such as that.

Mr. Colby. Yes. I think that that is clearly covered in the relationships with police forces. No assistance will be extended in that sense.

There are a variety of others which I frankly would like to go into in the executive session, but there are different ways in which American names can come into our possession, and we are taking steps to make sure that if these do come into our possession, they come in for a perfectly legitimate and proper reason, and are not kept or are not even accepted if there is not a clear justification for the existence of that name in our files.

Mr. Robinson. For example, will you cover what disposition is made of the investigation of applicants for jobs in the CIA that are rejected?

Mr. Colby. Well, I think it almost essential in that case that we keep the record.